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C YBER WAR, C YBERED CONFLIC T, AND THE
MARITIME DOMAIN
Peter Dombrowski and Chris C. Demchak

I

t has been well over a decade since the first “prophets” of information warfare
proclaimed a new age of conflict fought not just on air, sea, and land but with
electrons in what came to be known as “cyberspace.”1 Since these early predictions, many incidents have confirmed that criminals, random hackers, and
government-sanctioned specialists can wreak havoc on governments, military
communications systems, and corporations. The Stuxnet worm alone helped
delay—by months, perhaps years—the long-standing efforts of Iran to acquire
sufficient nuclear material to build nuclear weapons.2 Recent revelations of hacking campaigns against such publications as the Wall Street Journal and New York
Times have broadened concerns to include even the integrity of American democratic institutions.3 Meanwhile, the commander of U.S. Cyber Command has
characterized cyber attacks designed to gain access to the intellectual property
of American corporations as the “greatest transfer of wealth in human history.”4
How cyber assaults and government responses have been interpreted is not
uniform, however, especially with regard to whether the world will eventually
engage in “cyber war.”5 There is a community of scholars and analysts who argue
that cyber war will not happen or that the impact of cyberspace on armed conflict
will be limited.6 Others in the broad field of security studies, traditional computer science, or corporate communities claim that while some form of conflict
is happening, government officials, military officers, and legislators are suffering
from “threat inflation.” They argue that hyperbolic projections are leading to bad
policy decisions, especially with regard to specific adversaries, and that there has
been overinvestment in offensive cyber weapons rather than prudent defensive
measures.7 A best-selling nonfiction book has been criticized for contributing
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unnecessarily to public fears about the potential for cyber warfare.8 Many of
these critics argue that what are being called “cyber attacks” are really instances
of espionage, allowed by international law, or simply crime, which is not the
mission area of the nation’s military services.9 Some analysts detect the influence
of the military-industrial complex on policy debates. If hackers, official or not,
from China and Russia, terrorists, and criminals use the Internet to penetrate U.S
government systems, contractors see opportunities for increased revenue. As two
observers of cyberspace argue, “There’s an arms race in cyberspace, and a massively exploding new cyber-industrial complex that serves it.”10
Our position on this ongoing debate is that neither side has it right. Those
who have hyped cyber war as a completely new phenomenon or insist that cyber
threats are impossible to anticipate have missed key continuities with the past.
Especially missing is an underlying understanding about how humans and technologies have evolved and how the ways in which we analyze the cyber arena will
contribute to future conflicts. Despite the complexity of cyberspace, it is possible
to understand the broad trends in conflict and institutional responses. Those
who dismiss cyber war as mere hype or as driven by potential profits dismiss
much too quickly growing evidence of the importance of cyber operations for
the Navy and the nation.
Many participants in the debates on cyber conflict demonstrate insufficient
understanding of cyberspace. In particular, they do not demonstrate sufficient
command of the level of integration across public and private systems, across
sectors from economic to defense, and across levels of criticality in key societal
functions. For example, in earlier eras, one or even many bank heists could
not have taken down significant portions of the American financial system. In
contrast, what has been characterized as a single-digit mistake crashed the New
York Stock Exchange for several hours in 2010.11 In August 2013, the Amazon
“cloud” suddenly stopped working for hours, with no public explanation; the
best estimate is that during that period 40 percent of the Internet vanished in the
United States—that is, there was simply 40 percent less activity.12 What is labeled
espionage by observers seeing only a few incidents at a time can have cumulative
effects on deeply integrated national systems. Distinguishing between what is
crime and what espionage is not easy, nor is determining what actually represents
a long-term campaign of deceptive attacks. To make such distinctions clearly
requires recognition, in the first place, of the implications of extreme integration
for security in modern society. Critics often have considerable difficulty with this
cognitive leap—which is particularly unfortunate, as many of these critics have
considerable influence in national and international policy.
In this article we will attempt to explain the challenges and opportunities
of cyberspace for U.S. national security, especially naval forces. First, we will
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol67/iss2/7
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examine how cyberspace has affected conflict over the last decade and how it
will do so in the coming decades. Next, we will review how the U.S. government
has responded to the increasing number and variety of attacks on its own institutions and on the private sector at home and abroad. Third, we will focus on the
institutional evolution of the U.S. Navy as it attempts to fulfill the responsibilities
assigned to it by national-level strategies within the framework of its traditional
missions, capabilities, and culture. Finally, we will examine the specific systemic
operational challenges and opportunities posed by cyber operations. Our intent
is to help naval scholars, analysts, and operators begin understanding the new
world of cybered conflict in the maritime environment.13
CONFLICT AND CYBERSPACE
Cyberspace has opened up new avenues of conflict, added layers of complexity
to existing tactics and operations, and become increasingly influential in the
strategic calculus of several major powers in the international system. Cyberspace is neither totally new nor totally out of control, but it is now a global sociotechnical-economic system with major effects on the physical, economic, and
societal security of nations. Cyberspace has made it much too easy for aggressive
states and nonstate actors to reach remotely into other societies, threaten critical
government systems, and affect essential operations of both public and private
institutions.14 The question is how to characterize this new reality.
Although “cyber war” has entered into the common lexicon, we generally
avoid the term, because it misleads more than it illuminates. Instead, we prefer
the term “cybered conflict.”15 The phrase characterizes the essential nature of
modern military operations, from peacetime to high-intensity warfare. Cyber
activities by military forces (and often intelligence agencies, law-enforcement
organizations, and associated departments) take place in all types of conflict, during all phases of military operations, and at all levels of war. From our perspective, cybered conflict characterizes the whole spectrum of old and new forms of
conflict born of, enabled through, or dramatically altered by cyberspace.
All Phases of Military Operations Are Now Cybered
U.S. joint doctrine posits a notional six-phase model of joint and combined
military operations, ranging from Phase Zero (“Shaping”) through Phase III
(“Dominate,” or “breaking the enemy’s will for organized resistance or, in noncombat situations, control of the operational environment”) to Phase V (“Enable
Civil Authority”).16 For our purposes here, the details of what occurs in each
phase are less important than the fact that cyber tools, skills, units, and perceptions play roles in all of them. Whether shaping the future operating environment
by preparing for long-running conflicts of varying tempos and effects or for
cybered conflicts ranging from disruptions of critical systems to cyber-enabled
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2014
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destruction of military forces, American military specialists (including naval
officers and sailors) and their civilian counterparts from the intelligence agencies and the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security use a wide range of
offensive and defensive tools to support actions in the physical world. At each
stage they also have to defend against the efforts of adversaries—whether official
state representatives, terrorists, or criminals—trying to thwart American or allied
operations or to exploit them for their own ends.
All Levels of War Are Now Cybered
Classic national-security scholarship as taught at institutions of professional military education in the United States divides thinking about war into three levels:
tactics, operations, and strategy. According to joint doctrine, “strategy is a prudent
idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater and multinational objectives.” By
contrast, “tactics is the employment and ordered arrangement of forces in relation to each other.” For its part, “the operational level links strategy and tactics by
establishing operational objectives needed to achieve the military end states and
strategic objectives. It sequences tactical actions to achieve objectives.”17
Our position is again straightforward. Cybered conflict enters into play at all
three levels and connects them iteratively and systemically. At the strategic level,
national policies must provide commanders with the goals for cyberspace (and
to which cyber operations must contribute) and guidance regarding how cyber
instruments may be used consistent with national law, as well as means to acquire
and operate those tools. At the tactical level, commanders must fight battles using
not only kinetic means but also offensive and defensive cyber instruments. As
joint doctrine observes, all three levels overlap during the execution of a military
operation; therefore, “commanders and their staffs at all levels must anticipate
how their plans, operations, and actions may impact the other levels (those above
and those below).”18
All Types of Conflict Are Now Cybered
Typologies of conflict are many. The Department of Defense defines nineteen
types of warfare, ranging from acoustic to undersea.19 These various definitions
usually speak to the environment, factors, and conditions that must be understood to apply combat power successfully, protect the force, or complete the
mission. These elements might include enemy and friendly armed forces, infrastructure, weather, terrain, and the electromagnetic spectrum within operational
zones and areas of interest.20
U.S. military forces now prepare to fight in five domains:21 land, sea, air, space,
and cyber. In 2011 “cyber” was added—not without some modest resistance—as
the fifth domain, a nonphysical arena of military conflict.22
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol67/iss2/7
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We believe, however, that for security and military purposes cyberspace is not
a domain but a substrate. In our usage, a “substrate” is an underlying layer on
which modern society is built. Cyberspace uniquely underpins all four other warfighting domains. This substrate has a topology that is largely and (surprisingly
to some) territorial. Our argument that cyberspace is a substrate is thus contrary
to official usage and to increasingly commonplace assertions that cyberspace is
a domain.23 One reason that cyberspace is in fact not strictly a domain is that it
is a built environment—imagined, created, developed, sustained, and extended
by human intentions and actions. One analyst has noted “the generative capacity for unrelated and unaccredited audiences to build and distribute code and
content through the Internet.”24 As Michael Hayden, a retired Air Force general
and former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, once pointed out to an
audience of technologists, “God made the other four [domains]. You made the
last one. God did a better job.”25
One implication of cyberspace’s being a built environment is that it can be
unbuilt, remodeled, and perhaps in an extreme case even destroyed (say, by
electromagnetic pulse), at least temporarily and within spatial limits. This logic,
then, allows for the notion that an Internet “kill switch” exists or can be created.
No less an authority than the founder and chairman of Microsoft, Bill Gates, acknowledges that the Internet can be “switched off ”: “It’s not that hard to shut the
Internet down if you have military power where you can tell people that’s what’s
going to happen,” Gates said. “Whenever you do something extraordinary like
that you’re sort of showing people you’re afraid of the truth getting out, so it’s a
very difficult tactic, but certainly it can be shut off.”26 In several recent conflicts,
governments, including those of Egypt and Syria, have in effect flipped the switch
to turn off Internet access, however imperfectly, for their societies. The strategic,
operational, and tactical objectives of these acts are unclear at this point. Moreover, the effects have been temporary, as experts inside and outside the countries
work to make alternative connections.
Since World War II, the trajectory of U.S. military planning has favored joint
operations, with the services fighting together from their respective domains. As
we will discuss below, the services and a number of government agencies (for example, the National Security Agency, or NSA) share responsibility for operating
in cyberspace, defending military and civilian systems and infrastructure, and,
ultimately, conducting cyber operations as part of kinetic operations. But unlike the four other official war-fighting domains recognized by the government,
cyberspace, as a substrate, as we have noted, intersects with all the others, and it
is vulnerable to widespread disruption. This makes cyberspace all the more valuable; it is in effect the technological high ground, for not only the military and
intelligence services but government, civilian, and commercial sectors as well.
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2014
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Cyberspace is thus not a separate conflict space or host to a particular type of
conflict. Cybered conflict occurs along a spectrum that includes conflicts from
large to small—total war, small wars, wars of choice, and a host of others. In the
next twenty years, the tools of cyberspace will become so ubiquitous that we prefer to use the adjective “cybered,” since “cyber” is likely to be taken for granted
and abandoned. In the meantime, cyberspace is changing how governments
and their militaries and nonstate actors fight wars and conflicts. Organizing and
operating in joint, interagency, and combined (with friends, partners, and allies)
terms for cybered conflicts are not only sensible but strategically and operationally essential for success.
NATIONAL RESPONSES TO THE CHALLENGES OF CYBERSPACE
Given their decades-old and growing dependence on information and communications technologies for economic dominance and military power, the U.S.
military and government agencies have slowly developed policies, strategies, and
organizations to meet the challenges and possibilities of cyberspace. High-level
recognition of threats emanating from “cyber” began as early as the 1990s. In
1996 President William Clinton’s Executive Order 13010 created the President’s
Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, which included threats to the
nation’s economic and national security from cyber attacks within the scope of its
activities.27 Two years later, on the basis of the commission’s recommendations,
Presidential Decision Directive 63 established several cyber security–related
organizations, largely focused on malicious hackers or criminals who could
threaten critical national infrastructure.
The full extent of cyber threats became pressing after 9/11. That terrorists
could use the web to organize themselves to attack the United States and other
adversaries was becoming clear. In one high-profile example, documents found
in abandoned Al Qaeda houses after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan included
guidance from Osama Bin Laden on how to use electronic means to continue the
jihad and suggesting that 90 percent of Al Qaeda’s future efforts would involve
cyberspace.28
Chinese strategists have begun to develop their own concepts of cyber conflict,
focusing on major state adversaries, including the United States.29 The Persian
Gulf War of 1991 demonstrated to China (and other close observers) how hightechnology militaries could defeat adversaries who had advantages in troop
strength. The stunning results of U.S. operations against numerically superior
forces presented a major challenge to China’s perception of its own advantages in
future conflict—massed assets ranging from manpower to ships and missiles. According to some scholars, China’s search for a compensating strategy to match the
United States led it to rediscover Sun Tzu’s understanding of “indirect warfare.”30
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol67/iss2/7
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Several Chinese colonels even proposed a concept of “unconstrained warfare,”
a campaign that begins long before any armed conflict is apparent. This “warfare” seeks to disrupt potential enemies using the vulnerabilities of their (real or
potential) information systems, without regard for international norms or laws.
As a Western analyst concludes, “China [now] has the most extensive and most
practiced cyber-warfare capabilities in Asia, although the technical expertise is
very uneven.”31
By 2003, President George W. Bush signed several strategy documents focusing specifically on cyberspace. Rather than subsuming specific issues under a
general concern for critical infrastructure, as President Clinton had done, the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace and the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative specifically addressed the need to secure cyberspace and presented
that mission as a systemic challenge. These documents divided responsibility
for national cyber security among the Department of Defense (DoD), the newly
established Department of Homeland Security, and the White House itself. While
the White House retained overall policy authority, Homeland Security was given
the task of ensuring “critical infrastructure protection” of the homeland—but in
terms of a “coordinating,” not regulating or operating, mission. DoD was charged
with protecting its own global grid of computers and communications systems
but received no authority to inform or protect anyone else’s network, even if
their health determined whether the DoD’s own Global Information Grid could
be protected. The Department of Defense and its subagencies rely heavily on
commercial networks to transfer data across the globe;32 nevertheless, individual
federal agencies, states, and private corporations were left by and large to defend
themselves.33
Even with the increased attention by the Bush administration to cyber security, the breadth of the nation’s vulnerability was not yet fully apparent. In
2003 only 60 percent of the American population owned computers, and only
50 percent had personal access to an Internet connection.34 Pressure on officials
and policy makers would increase as more citizens, businesses, and government
activities came to depend on uninterrupted information and assured access to
cyberspace, to include the Internet, the World Wide Web, and over time, peerto-peer computer networks.
Toward the end of the first decade of the 2000s, the unsettling successes of
the cyber penetrations, extractions, and remote “backdoor” operations mounted
steadily across DoD and other agencies.35 Existing (“legacy”) informationassurance policies, programs, and tools were failing to stem the tide of attacks.
To make matters worse, a growing portion of publicly revealed data on cyber
attacks pointed toward the existence of a small but global population of highly
skilled, determined, and persistent “wicked actors.”36 Their successes were often
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2014
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discovered only months or years later, long after the damage had been done. In
2006, the Bush administration issued another series of documents to clarify toplevel policies, procedures, and responsibilities. The National Security Strategy and
Quadrennial Defense Review outlined the broad bases for U.S. government policies for dealing with cyber war and cyber threats more generally, within the wider
context of conventional threats and the evolving international environment.37
Most notably, the Department of Defense published its National Military
Strategy for Cyberspace Operations, which assigned U.S. Strategic Command
(STRATCOM) and the Joint Staff to develop an implementation plan for the
defense of cyberspace.38 The concept of a joint command to deal with cyberspace
gradually emerged from this planning effort. The timing of the decision to create
a unified cyber command was influenced by the well-intentioned miscalculation
of several senior Air Force leaders who in 2005–2006 unilaterally declared their
service the lead agency for cyber security. Publicity associated with an Air Force
effort to develop a national cyber command may have prompted Robert Gates,
then Secretary of Defense, to become involved directly in laying the foundation
for a DoD-wide command for cyberspace operations.39 Meanwhile, the other
services, including the Navy, had begun preparing to create cyber-security and
-warfare units of their own.40
During roughly the same period, 2004–2007, General James E. Cartwright, as
commander of STRATCOM, was struck by the magnitude of ongoing assaults on
DoD networks. He became concerned by massive losses of classified internal data
and by the constant flood of attacks experienced. General Cartwright’s efforts
to protect STRATCOM and DoD itself from cyber threats fueled the design of
a major command devoted to cyberspace. In particular, he argued that the new
organization should be a “subunified” command (that is, a subordinate unified
command, reporting in this case to STRATCOM) so that it would be less likely to
be marginalized. General Cartwright continued to sponsor the idea of a national
cyber command when he became the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
in 2007.41 It would, however, take more than the interest of a vice chief to create
such a command.
In late 2008 a computer “worm” infected unclassified and classified American networks, traveling via USB memory sticks from infected computers in
Afghanistan to DoD systems across the globe. The worm opened so-called back
doors that potentially allowed adversaries to control infected systems. Upon
discovering the breach, DoD rapidly closed down networks and restricted the
use of USB sticks and most removable media, to stop reinfection.42 This infection was followed closely by the “Conficker” worm, which targeted the Microsoft
Windows operating system used by the armed services of many NATO members,
including the United States. Conficker spread quickly and opened new back
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol67/iss2/7
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doors accessible to unknown attackers.43 For a period, someone, somewhere, had
remote access to computer networks on NATO warships in port and to systems
used by combat units in the field.44 These back-to-back infections changed the
priority given cyber security by the White House and DoD.45
By the spring of 2009, experts generally accepted that protecting the government, and particularly DoD, against Conficker and a host of other cyber
threats would require major new steps.46 During the first year of President
Barack Obama’s administration, the urgency increased substantially; investigative reporting has revealed that the president and his closest national-security
team were not only working on defensive measures but contemplating offensive
actions using cyber weapons.47 Upon taking office the Obama administration
ordered a “60-Day Cyberspace Policy Review,” spearheaded by Melissa Hathaway,
a former Bush administration cyber-security expert, to shape the fundamentals
for future cyber-security strategic and organizational changes.48 In May 2009,
with the review complete, President Obama declared cyberspace to be a first-tier
priority for national security. The White House Cyberspace Policy Review stated
that “America’s failure to protect cyberspace is one of the most urgent national
security problems facing the new administration.”49
In June 2009, Secretary of Defense Gates announced the formation of a new
U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) as a subunified command subordinate to
STRATCOM and collocated it with the government’s main source of computer
and electronic expertise, the NSA. To ease the flow of information between the
two organizations, the director of NSA was to be “dual-hatted” as the commander of CYBERCOM. The arrangement allowed at least one clear point where
authorities granted by Title 10 and Title 50 of the U.S. Code could be balanced
and decisive actions taken.50 Furthermore, a single leader could review all operations, emerging trends, and long-range effects to develop and coordinate
comprehensive tactics, operations, and strategies. In principle, then, the organizational structure allowed the new command to deal with the complexity of
cybered conflict. “Cyber warriors” in Cyber Command and the intelligence and
information experts of the National Security Agency would in this way more
readily collaborate to detect, track, thwart, or stop adversaries crippling DoD’s
operational readiness.51
The individual military services had equally important roles in foreseeing
threats, defending their mission areas and forces, and disrupting cyber attacks
“forward.” In a June 2009 DoD memorandum, Secretary Gates asked each of the
service secretaries to establish a component to support Cyber Command, a component that “possesses the required technical capability [to secure freedom of
action in cyberspace] and remains focused on the integration of cyberspace operations. Further, this command must be capable of synchronizing war-fighting
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2014

NWC_Spring2014Review.indb 79

9

2/14/14 1:08 PM

80

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 67 [2014], No. 2, Art. 7

effects across the global security environment as well as providing support to civil
authorities and international partners.”52 Each service was to stand up an interim
command by 1 October 2009 and to have it fully operational by 1 October 2010.
The services were allowed to design their own organizations and to incorporate skills, tools, and units as they saw fit, as long as all were able to contribute to
the mission of U.S. Cyber Command. The Navy and Air Force in particular had
already made considerable progress, in anticipation of the order. Meanwhile, the
Department of Homeland Security was instructed to reinvigorate its efforts to
persuade the critical infrastructure community—largely privately held—to improve its defenses against remote attacks. By midsummer of 2010, all the services
had established rudimentary cyber commands. The process of reconciling differences in structure, guidance, and mission then began in earnest. This process
continues unabated today, and we will later discuss its implications for the Navy.
In May 2011 the Obama administration outlined its publicly releasable, external policies in the International Strategy for Cyberspace;53 the Secretary of
Defense issued the Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace
two months later.54 Each statement aimed to inform the American public and
the publics of allied states that the United States is taking cyber threats seriously.
These documents also signaled to adversaries that preying on American targets
would no longer be easy or risk-free. The U.S. government would defend itself
and strike back as necessary.55
THE NAVY AND CYBERSPACE
At the time of the July 2009 Gates memo, the Navy was already designing new
organizations capable of meeting cyber challenges. The Navy had spent most of
the 2000–2008 period trying to understand the threats posed by cyber attacks
and intrusions.56 It had established a task force to study how attacks through
cyberspace were affecting Navy assets and operational readiness. The task force’s
members understood early that the service needed to identify cyber-capable
personnel with skill sets ranging from intelligence techniques to network systems
and electronic warfare. In the fall of 2009, Admiral Gary Roughead, then Chief of
Naval Operations, stood up Fleet Cyber Command and Tenth Fleet.57
The new cyber-focused command needed to provide the entire Navy with
the specific missions, guidance, technical tools, and unit-level organizational
structures necessary for cyber defense and offense. However, in doing so it had
to work within the traditional fleet structure, to be compatible with the structures
and missions of existing numbered fleets, and to serve as the Navy component
supporting U.S. Cyber Command as a whole. The task force’s members had also
known—drawing on the longtime, well-established relationship between the
U.S. Navy intelligence community and the National Security Agency—that the
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol67/iss2/7
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complexity of cyberspace as an operational environment would demand rapid,
accurate responses at tempos commensurate with the scale and harm of the
threats. These qualities would be exceptionally difficult to achieve if cyber was
not mainstreamed across the service. These responses would be nearly impossible to execute rapidly if bureaucratic “silos” were left in place between the Navy
and joint intelligence, electronic warfare, network administration, and cryptology, among other specialized organizations.58
In January 2010, when Fleet Cyber Command (known as FCC, or Fleet
Cyber) was declared operational as the Navy’s component of CYBERCOM, its
organization was unique among its service counterparts. Rather than splitting
combat-support functions, such as intelligence, from operational combat missions as other services have done, its structure integrates them and thereby supports both U.S. Cyber Command and the Navy’s own requirements. A single flag
officer leads not only FCC, an Echelon 2 command (i.e., reporting directly to the
Chief of Naval Operations), but also the newly recommissioned Tenth Fleet, as a
subordinate Echelon 3 command—an institutional design intended to allow the
Navy to act quickly in a hostile and deeply cybered world.59
Nonetheless, and despite the best efforts of their designers, leaders, and champions, Fleet Cyber Command and Tenth Fleet have not found it easy to meet
the challenges of cyberspace. First, both have themselves been assaulted from
cyberspace even as they experience the normal growing pains of a new command
structure. Second, long-standing internal divisions in the naval service have complicated their manning, training, equipment, employment, and assessment. Inside and outside the Navy numerous debates are ongoing about what constitutes
the cybered conflict space and even whether it is truly a “domain,” as designated
by DoD. Among its critics are some who fear change, some (a small number) who
understand computer systems, and even optimists convinced that a fully integrated approach to cyberspace would achieve nearly everything that might be done
in the physical world. In brief, like much of the U.S. government, CYBERCOM,
and its counterparts in the other services, Fleet Cyber Command is still learning
its own missions, strengths, weaknesses, and evolving opportunities.60
In late November 2012 the Navy took several other steps toward sustaining cyber capabilities. The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information
Dominance / Director of Naval Intelligence (Vice Admiral Kendall L. Card) and
Commander, U.S. Fleet Cyber Command / Tenth Fleet (Vice Admiral Michael S.
Rogers) signed three documents:
• Navy Strategy for Achieving Information Dominance 2013–2017 61
• Navy Cyber Power 202062
• Navy Information Dominance Corps Human Capital Strategy 2012–2017.63
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2014

NWC_Spring2014Review.indb 81

11

2/14/14 1:08 PM

82

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 67 [2014], No. 2, Art. 7

Each demonstrates the evolution of Navy thinking about how to serve, survive,
and excel in a cybered maritime environment. It is too soon to evaluate fully the
Navy’s progress in effective cybered conflict. It is time, however, to relate the
Navy’s thinking to what is coming in the dynamically evolving global cyberspace.
Trends already evident across the digitized world will affect future military conflict, the cyber threat environment in the maritime domain, and the Navy’s own
efforts to establish organizational and operational frameworks for meeting cyber
challenges in the near-to-medium term. Several of these trends will impact the
Navy’s ability to fulfill the “sailing direction” issued by the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Jonathan Greenert, that “cyberspace will be operationalized with
capabilities that span the electromagnetic spectrum—providing superior awareness and control when and where we need it.”64
THE CHALLENGES OF CYBERED CONFLICT IN THE MARITIME
DOMAIN
What is different about the challenges facing U.S. naval forces during cybered
conflicts?65 How can naval forces contribute to combined and joint operations
that include cyber operations? The problem is not just that the cyberspace substrate connects most of the world and allows intrusions from a wide range of state
and nonstate actors. Rather, we argue, it is that cyberspace favors the offensive
military capabilities of adversaries and enhances their potentially destabilizing
effects on the nature and level of interstate conflict in the coming years.66
The offense/defense balance in international affairs has long been considered critical to the prospects for the reduction of conflict and the promotion
of international peace.67 Recent scholarship concludes, at least preliminarily,
that “innovations in Information and Communication Technology (ICT) allow
states to take greater risks and adopt more vigilant or offensive positions toward
adversaries. Cyber capabilities do not cause armed conflict, but make decisions
to escalate easier and cheaper.”68 Scholars are only now developing a serious research program to understand the impact of offensive cyber instruments on the
future of conflict.69 There are still scholars who remain skeptical about the utility
of offense/defense theory for understanding the impact of technological change
on war and peace or, more important, the effects of cyber operations. One, for
example, argues, “This is not to say that cyber attacks would have no effect, only
that they are extremely unlikely to prove strategically decisive. A capability to
address cyber threats is then useful, but planning for cyber warfare must be conducted within the larger framework of recognition that these capabilities are not
in fact a game changer.”70
In our view, the “game changing” aspects of cyberspace do not lie in cyber warfare at the high end of the spectrum of conflict. Rather, the strategically decisive
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aspects of cyberspace concern the three significant advantages that its current
globally unfettered structure offers attackers: relatively risk-free opportunities in
the scale, proximity, and precision of cyber “weapons.” These advantages make
attacks cheaper, easier, and more effective for both state and nonstate actors.
While they may be temporary and transitional, they exist now, and in our judgment they will continue to exist for the next fifteen to twenty years.
First, like the superpowers of old, adversaries can readily use the web to scale
attacking units from small to large, tightly organized or loosely linked. Further,
attackers can use the web for communication, training, supply, and operations,
even as they scale up and down and back again. For one example, they can
cheaply scale up by buying, or even renting, “botnets” on the global black market.
A botnet—a linked network of software hidden in millions of innocent computers—can be commanded to participate in attacks. Today there are hundreds of
thousands of botnets in use, for sale, or lying dormant, on machines whose users
do not know that they are infected.71
Second, to pose a threat, adversaries have no need to move into close physical
proximity to collect critical information or to deploy long-range expensive weapons. Relatively high-quality “signals intelligence” is now available to anyone with
time and an Internet connection.72 Third, the precision in targeting is no longer
constrained to line-of-sight, blue-water, or over-the-horizon military capabilities.
Cyber-enabled attackers can vary the precision of their targeting from a single
person to cities, regions, or entire nations.
However, these three factors, notwithstanding the offensive advantages they
offer attackers, may also provide opportunities for the U.S. Navy’s offensive and
defensive cyber operations.
Scale
Given the reliance of global commerce; governments at all levels; and military,
intelligence, and law-enforcement organizations on the communication systems
and computers associated with cyberspace, the institutional scale required to
cause real harm has dropped dramatically.73 Small organizations—including
criminal enterprises, terrorist groups, and subunits of national militaries—can
now use the Internet to spy on, harass, and attack with relatively modest investments in personnel and equipment. States with modest cyber resources can
achieve disproportionate effects with appropriate tools, skill, and organizational
structures. Small states might also achieve asymmetric advantages by investing in
cyber instruments or employing proxies with better capabilities.
Small, covert, and even part-time organizations scattered in large enough
numbers across the globe can undercut traditional threat and warning indicators employed by U.S. intelligence agencies. The modern military’s standard set
of such indicators identifies emerging cyber threats much less effectively than it
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does conventional attackers. For the Navy, as for the other services and government agencies, it will be even harder to assess the cyber capabilities and intentions of potential adversaries than to evaluate their conventional and nuclear
forces. One pressing question urged by such uncertainty is how resilient the Navy
can become.
Proximity
Until the modern era, most conflict was confined to visual range.74 For most of
history, the farther an attacker from physical view, the less one could know about
whether a given weapon or unit was the right choice to use against it, at that time,
in that place. Even during the Cold War only major powers could develop and
deploy large numbers of over-the-horizon weapons; they were expensive to build,
required considerable long-distance intelligence to be effective, and outstripped
standard damage-assessment techniques.
Proximity thus mattered enormously for attackers.75 Intelligence was (and
is) crucial for fighting and winning. Getting up close to look, and in a timely
manner, was throughout history the most straightforward way to collect usable
information. Critical and timely knowledge—the “signals intelligence” of superpowers and close neighbors—has never, however, been cheap to acquire or easy
to validate.76
With the global connectivity of cyberspace, however, no longer does an enemy need to move into physical proximity to pose and execute a threat. Now
too, adversaries both actual and potential can obtain intelligence inexpensively.
If hackers can access a system and gain control of key functions, they can hide
successes, elude defenses, and leave behind back doors by which to reenter in the
future. Hackers need not be on the same continent as, let alone physically touch,
targeted computers.77
Often the information that cyber attackers need to target a system is already
online, posted for legitimate reasons. Terrorist sites when raided are almost always found to contain caches of maps, specific data, and operationally relevant
material on potential targets that had been harvested from publicly accessible
Internet sites. Such information is often considered public information that
must be provided to citizens, investors, and internal customers. Democratic
norms and laws regarding transparency and accountability often encourage or
even require government agencies and private enterprises to make available information that would be useful to cyber thieves, spies, and attackers. Public and
private cyber-security experts have sought to discourage such “oversharing,” but
most Western democracies have a long way to go. After the attacks on the United
States in September 2001, for example, much public data about nuclear power
plants and nation-spanning oil pipelines were removed from public websites
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in the United States; such data had already been found in Al Qaeda computers
seized in Afghanistan.78
While great powers and some sophisticated states, like Israel, still enjoy comparative advantages in signals and various other technical means of collection
and assessment, intelligence gaps between these states and their adversaries may
be closing. Strategists, planners, and policy makers will eventually need to adapt
to this new geostrategic reality of cyberspace.79 For maritime powers throughout
history, forward-deployed fleets have been crucial for defeating land powers. Naval forces operating in theaters far from home could quickly and independently
collect information and decide whether and how to act. Only peer maritime
powers, and few land-based adversaries, could challenge that powerful capability. The U.S. Navy is still in the business of long-distance power projection. In a
cybered world, however, the task is more problematic. The Navy must adapt to
the loss of its own proximity advantage. No longer will its bases, battle groups,
forward infrastructure, and allied navies be immune just because they are over
the horizon or far from the battle space. We believe that a more diffused set of
threats and adversaries will be able to fight at a distance against the Navy and the
nation. Another major research question for the Navy, then, is how to make proximity matter again, how to regain its traditional operational advantages against
cyber-capable foes.
Precision
The history of warfare demonstrates the many physical constraints on precision
in choosing how often, where, and when to attack, given the size of the target and
its ability to frustrate or defeat its attackers. Historically, precision has been expensive; few polities aside from empires, superpowers, and perhaps close neighbors have had the means to target their enemies precisely, in order to achieve
operational success or conserve resources. In a cyber attack or a conventional
operation accompanied by cyber tactics, this constraint fades into merely a question of time, knowledge, and occasionally patience. Attackers can now choose
very specific targets—for today, for this tool, for this duration, and for this or
that end. They can focus on individuals—by bank account, name, citizenship,
location, or entertainment preference. They can also target specific firms, cities,
or nations with similarly individualized parameters, with fairly small investment
in readily available computer applications.80
Correspondingly, adversaries can use imprecision strategically as well. Cyber
attackers often intentionally build a certain amount of imprecision into their
“weapons” to ensure they hit their intended targets. For example, to take down
a particular subset of users of an innocent application, attackers can purchase
destructive malicious software, such as a “Trojan,” on cyber crime’s global black
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market;81 with it they can attack the application anywhere it is installed in the
world. Among the victims will be their true targets; for the attackers, the others
represent either irrelevant collateral damage or extra benefit. Such wider harm is
rarely a concern to cybered attackers, except perhaps when the attack is undertaken by state actors bound by international law.82
In fact, when precision in the form of restraint is displayed, that characteristic
itself suggests that the attackers are state actors. Usually only states concerned
with international legitimacy try to avoid the potential for collateral damage
posed by cyber weapons (Trojans, malware, etc.) that escape “into the wild.” One
of the key indicators that a government had been involved in attacks on Estonia
in 2007 was the degree of constraint exhibited in the timing, choice of targets, and
duration. Many analysts presume that proxy actors were paid by Russian officials
to attack Estonian targets but not beyond certain redlines.83 Precision, however,
may also reflect organizational maturity and a wider view of the consequences
of success, of failure, or of errors that send the attack spinning out of control.84 If
true, the Russian actors behind the attacks showed restraint not because they had
to but for their own reasons.85
For the Navy and the U.S. military more generally, the development of precision weapons, both offensive and defensive, has long been a priority—at least
since the development of the Norden bombsight in World War II.86 Precision increases the effectiveness of weapons and reduces costs (although in direct terms
this is contestable, given the per-unit cost of many precise weapons). Professional
militaries have often increased accuracy to decrease the volume of munitions
employed, limit the number of aircraft sorties required, reduce (at least in theory)
logistical expenses, and, ultimately, minimize collateral risks. At the same time,
cost-effectiveness is said to lower the barriers to using coercion and reduction in
collateral damage to increase the legitimacy of some forms of warfare, by some
domestic and international observers.87 One of these has argued that “precision
weaponry has revolutionized contemporary warfare by multiplying the effectiveness of using air and ground power together.”88 In a similar fashion, cyber operations may, by changing the roles of scale, proximity, and precision in warfare, increase the effectiveness of air, sea, land, and space operations when employed to
reduce collateral damage and avoid risk to forces undertaking legitimate action.
In the cybered world, precision targeting is not necessarily an expensive option open only to major powers. Precision can help achieve aims without crossing
redlines that might provoke wider kinetic conflict. Cybered conflict can occur
along a spectrum across all phases of war, and long before any kinetic exchange,
adversaries can use precision cyber tools to tilt the conflict in their favor. In particular, adversaries may use precise cyber weapons to undermine the resilience of
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the targeted state’s military or infrastructure, or even its entire economic system,
sometimes without declaring their intention or being identified as the attackers.
The critical research question here for the Navy is how to turn the offensive
advantages of precision into a more costly liability for attackers. Standardization in software and hardware systems, for example, can make offensive action
easy for adversaries. The now-standard obligation to reduce costs by acquiring
commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) equipment often makes systems cheaper but
more vulnerable in cybered conflicts. The U.S. military, including the Navy,
might avoid providing the COTS advantage to potential adversaries by revising
its acquisition process, to include the design of information architectures and
the procurement of system components. It will require considerable ingenuity,
but increasing variation within otherwise standardized equipment; off-the-shelf
software architectures; and routine-driven procedures, units, or deployment patterns may hold long-term benefits.
Twenty years ago, the proponents of a “revolution in military affairs” (RMA)
led by the U.S. military made all manner of claims for the impact of precision
weapons on the future of conflict. This is not the place to wade into arguments
about the nature of the RMA, past or present. But the impact of cyberspace on
the scale, proximity, and precision of warfare, combined with the utility of cyber
instruments in all phases, levels, and types of war, suggests a far greater impact
for cyber than the classic RMA. By confronting directly the advantages of scale,
proximity, and precision in cyber conflict, the Navy and CYBERCOM may both
increase the effectiveness of traditional air, sea, land, and space operations and
prepare for the inevitable more dynamic and complex cybered threat environment. In short, the challenge to the Navy is to reduce all three systemic advantages for attackers: to make it harder for them to choose to be precise or not at
their will, more difficult for their operations to be “close” though not physically
close, and more expensive and personally risky for them to organize dispersed
strangers or covertly to manipulate masses of distant innocent systems.
THE CURRENT AND FUTURE CYBER “LITTORAL”
Cybered conflict is here to stay and must be taken seriously even if cyber war in
the conventional sense—that is, resulting in combat deaths—is not likely. Cyber
operations, both offensive and defensive, will play major roles in all levels of war
(from terrorism and counterinsurgency to high-intensity conflict and all the
gradations between). Conflict involving cyber will neither stay wholly within
networks nor prove over time to have been a fad or simply a subset of existing
tactical, operational, or technological categories. From both empirical and conceptual perspectives, cybered conflict is neither a “flash in the pan” or a “lesser
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included case”; it has already proved to be an evolutionary force, slowly altering
the likely future conditions for interstate competition and the potentials for kinetic forms of battle. Scholars, analysts, and, most important, operators need to
think systematically about how cyber operations—offensive and defensive, to the
extent that distinction still makes sense—affect tactics, operations, and strategies.
Future military and security analyses of “cyber” writ large by the U.S. government, or indeed that of any state, should adopt a systemic approach adapted
from the logic of complex socio-technological systems and how new developments change what can be used by defenders and abused by adversaries. For
example, since such systems are in reality “patterns of artifacts, institutions, rules
and norms assembled and maintained to perform economic and social activities,” the Navy’s scholars and strategists need to think through what current and
new technologies, from 3D printing and autonomous private vehicles to new
materials, will do to change those patterns.89 Many current arguments about
cyber operations in the government and policy communities are characterized
by hype, false analogy, and, worse, misunderstanding of the technical, engineering, and scientific underpinning of the terms. Instead, the conversation should
be about what is today being systematically lost, threatened, and penetrated on a
vast scale. Furthermore, emergent technologies labeled “disruptive technologies”
will change the calculus, some reducing scale, proximity, and precision obstacles
even further, others offering opportunities to enhance barriers if the defenders
are wise enough to see the opportunities.90
Cybered conflicts occur only partly inside computer and communications
networks; what the Navy has viewed as the “littoral” in bounding its area of concern (traditionally the intersection of the land and sea) is increasingly difficult
to identify. Large sections of what matters to the maritime services now overlap
with traditional military, intelligence, and even commercial operations across
the nation and the globe. Furthermore, the internationally accepted rules of war
are difficult to apply in cyber war. However, in the context of a broader notion of
conflict (i.e., as cybered conflict), these rules would find resonance with much
of what happens before and during a kinetic conflict.91 Other well-known forms
of conflict, such as hybrid warfare, asymmetric conflicts, and counterterrorism,
are also cybered conflicts to the extent that key events depend on the cyberspace
substrate.92
The U.S. government has struggled since the Clinton administration to
adapt to the policy, legal, organizational, and operational demands of conflict
in cyberspace. Progressing by fits and starts, key policy makers have reached
a consensus that cyberspace is an important arena for conflict, one worthy of
resources, specialized organizations, different interagency relationships, and
eventually perhaps legislative action.93 Much remains to be done, especially with
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regard to domestic policies, organizational implementation, and resourcing, but
since the establishment of CYBERCOM and its service equivalents the defense
and intelligence communities have become better equipped to meet external
cyber challenges and take advantage of American cyber technologies to protect
national interests.
Two of the most likely and challenging scenarios for future crises, perhaps
even shooting wars, will clearly involve cyber operations: Iran and North Korea.94 In each case, Phase Zero operations involving both sides, as well as third
parties, already appear to involve cyber attacks of various types. If kinetic operations eventually take place, we may see the results of several decades of cyber
“preparation of the battlefield,” ranging from tainted supply chains to embedded
malware. For the time being, serious assessments and many details are obscure
and will likely remain so until leaks and eventual declassification reveal the full
extent of cyber operations.95 In the interim, a more systemic view will enable
the United States, with its already-demonstrated considerable cyber capabilities
in disruption work, to balance those capabilities with the resilience needed for
robust “cyber power.”
The Navy will be an integral part of that cyber power. The Navy has led
service-level efforts in developing, deploying, operating, and sustaining complex electronic systems in the past.96 Thanks to innovative institutional changes,
it may be the service best positioned to integrate cyber fully into its culture,
organizational structure, and operations.97 As a maritime force, it has a longestablished cultural acceptance of the deception, masking, mobility, and improvised independent operations that deployed ships have needed for survival in
peace as well as war. At present, however, an assumption of uninterrupted communications has diminished its institutional capacity to sail resiliently under the
cyber “radar,” despite millions of opportunistic “hunters.” The newer forms of
conflict enabled by cyberspace require a rediscovery of inclinations buried in
the Navy’s history and culture and a repurposing of them for the new—much
more complex, deceptive, and sensor-rich—environment. The “littoral” may be
defined more in terms of what one keeps the enemy from easily knowing and how
abruptly one can emerge in the enemy’s near proximity than of what beach needs
to be crossed. The sociotechnical systems the service depends on today need to
change, at the hands of officers and sailors who understand the basics of the cyber
substrate as it is today and as it is evolving. We argue—though only time and trial
by fire will confirm the proposition—that the Navy may be uniquely qualified to
adapt to cybered conflict, if the research is done and the new sociotechnical lines
of evolution are identified.
A systemic understanding of cyber and research along lines identified above
are needed not only for the Navy but also for the nation as a whole, if the Navy
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is to develop its portion of national cyber power. In the coming transitional cybered conflict age, cyber power will rest on a balance between the resilience of
the system being attacked and that system’s ability to reach forward and disrupt
in advance the small numbers of very skilled wicked actors able to overcome that
resilience. This balance of resilience and disruption will apply to the Navy as
well as the nation as a whole. When it is achieved, the nation will have in effect
pursued an overarching cyber “security resilience” strategy redressing the advantages that today cyberspace gives the offense. Effective and robust cyber power
diminishes the value of any adversary’s “counterresilience” strategies intended
to wear down deceptively the resilience of the defender’s whole socio-technicaleconomic system.
Today the United States has allies who are well intentioned but simply cannot
find the economic resources to invest in the cyber security that they know their
economic, critical infrastructure, and national-security systems require. When a
service or nation becomes a cyber power, it will have greater freedom of choice
in the coming transitional era and better chances of maintaining that power in
the era that will follow. The more the Navy is able to answer the systemic cyber
challenges and reduce the scale, proximity, and precision advantages attackers
enjoy today, the better prepared it will be for the bordered, encrypted, and technologically diverse future international system. The more systemically the Navy
contributes to its own cyber security, the more critical a player it will be in ensuring the cyber power and the well-being of the nation as a whole, as the cybered
world gradually restructures itself in response to global economic, demographic,
technological, and security challenges.
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